The FINANCIAL — Armenia’s pursuit of Western integration under Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan has been marked by apparent contradictions, most notably his decision to attend the Moscow Victory Day Parade on May 9, 2025. This move, set against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine and the European Union’s firm opposition to the event, raises questions about Armenia’s commitment to EU alignment. Comparing Armenia’s EU relations with those of Serbia and Slovakia reveals differing dynamics shaped by historical ties, geopolitical strategies, and EU expectations.
Since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan has pushed Armenia toward Western integration, evidenced by a 2025 draft bill for EU membership and a strategic partnership with the United States. Armenia has diversified security alliances, opting for EU border monitors over Russian-led alternatives and freezing participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These steps signal a pivot from Russia, driven by Moscow’s failure to support Armenia during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War and its preoccupation with Ukraine.
However, Pashinyan’s attendance at the Moscow parade, commemorating the Soviet WWII victory, undermines these efforts. The EU, through High Representative Kaja Kallas, warned against participation, citing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
Armenia’s presence alongside leaders from China and Serbia risks being perceived as tacit alignment with Moscow, clashing with its EU aspirations. This duality reflects Armenia’s economic dependence on Russia via the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the presence of Russian military bases, complicating a full Western shift. Critics argue this reveals double standards, as Armenia seeks EU benefits while maintaining Russian ties, potentially stalling integration talks.
Armenia, not an EU candidate, enjoys flexibility but faces scrutiny. Its Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement with the EU offers limited trade access, constrained by EAEU membership. Pashinyan’s Moscow visit may slow EU engagement, though Armenia’s non-candidate status limits direct consequences. The EU seeks Armenia’s alignment on sanctions against Russia, but Yerevan’s neutrality in the Ukraine conflict and parade attendance signal hedging.
Serbia, an EU candidate, faces stricter expectations. Its refusal to adopt EU sanctions against Russia and President Aleksandar Vučić’s planned parade attendance have stalled accession talks. The EU views Serbia’s balancing of Russian and Western ties as a breach of membership criteria, with warnings of halted integration. Serbia’s reliance on Russian energy and historical ties mirror Armenia’s, but its candidate status amplifies EU pressure.
Armenia’s parade attendance risks perceptions of double standards, undermining its EU credibility. Unlike Serbia, where EU leverage is direct, or Slovakia, where membership affords autonomy, Armenia’s non-candidate status allows flexibility but limits influence. The Ukraine war amplifies EU sensitivity, and Pashinyan’s move may delay Armenia’s EU aspirations, though historical WWII ties provide a partial justification.
Armenia’s challenge lies in balancing Russian dependence with Western ambitions, a delicate act Serbia and Slovakia navigate with different constraints.
Georgia, unlike Armenia, has not confirmed participation in the 2025 Moscow parade, reflecting its strained relations with Russia and pro-EU stance. Tbilisi’s official position, as inferred from government actions and public sentiment, prioritizes European integration over Russian engagement.
The Georgian Dream party’s 2024 suspension of EU accession talks until 2028 sparked massive anti-government protests, with President Salome Zourabichvili and demonstrators demanding EU alignment.
Georgia commemorates Victory Day domestically with small local events like wreath-laying at Vake Park, but avoids Moscow’s parade, associating it with Russian influence.
The majority of Georgians considers Russia as the main enemy.
This stems from historical grievances—Russia’s 1921 invasion, 2008 war, and occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia—reinforced by the EU’s condemnation of the parade.
Tbilisi’s absence underscores its rejection of Russian narratives, contrasting with Armenia’s pragmatic attendance
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