The FINANCIAL — “Georgia’s place in the Russo-Ukrainian conflict should be with all those who are trying to keep channels of dialogue between the conflicting parties open,” suggested Ortwin Hennig, German Ambassador to Georgia.
“By signing the Association Agreement with the European Union, Georgia has made a huge step forwards. A step forwards into the family of European states and peoples – to whom Georgia and its citizens historically and culturally belong. The Agreement anchors Georgia in the western structures.
But we have to be frank: Georgia now, indeed, faces new challenges. The Association Agreement is certainly not the end of the process of moving closer towards Europe. And the preliminary enforcement of the DCFTA since 1 September hasn’t yet, of course, resulted in an immediate economic boost, with more jobs, investments etc. Rather, Georgia is currently at a starting point: Reform and legal approximation are necessary in many fields of national legislation, be it in economic, social or environmental policy – to mention just a few. And these restructuring processes may create economic difficulties for some branches and social problems for some people. But Georgian society should not consider these reforms as challenges and burdens – rather as chances and investments for a better Georgia as part of the European family.
Q. Georgia did not take into consideration the EU’s suggestion to avoid increasing its export volume to Russia. In addition, the current government considers the restoration of trade relations with Russia to be a great advantage. Do you think that such steps call into question Georgia’s political orientation?
A. There is no doubt about Georgia’s political orientation. The signing of the AA and DCFTA in June has made that perfectly clear. And the dialogue and cooperation, including military cooperation, that continue between the EU, NATO, their member states and Georgia on so many issues shows that as well. The latest evidence is the substantial package of cooperative measures that NATO and Georgia agreed on at the recent NATO summit in Wales. This package rests on the solid foundation of Georgia’s western orientation and its ambition to join the European and Euroatlantic structures.
Georgia’s move to restore relations with Russia is by no means contrary to its Western orientation. Actually, Germany and other western countries support the idea of dialogue between Tbilisi and Moscow, and of intensified economic and cultural relations between the two neighbours. This dialogue with your neighbour, while not sidetracking the EU and NATO relationships, is beneficial to all.
Q. Georgia has stated that it will be sending medical and humanitarian aid to Ukraine. Is there any room to worry that such steps might irritate Russia? And where do you see the place of Georgia during the Russo-Ukrainian conflict?
A. Georgia’s decision to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine, again, reflects the country’s firm political orientation and alignment with Europe and the U.S., and of course with the Government of Ukraine. And it’s a strong demonstration of solidarity with the people of Ukraine, who stood side by side with the Georgian people during their years of difficult. This decision shouldn’t surprise, nor irritate, Russia.
Georgia’s place in this conflict should be with all those who are trying to keep channels of dialogue between the conflicting parties open. And Georgia, I think, has managed well during the recent months to show its political orientation and support to its Ukrainian neighbour and to maintain dialogue and the process of finding a modus operandi with Russia.
Q. Many experts and researchers have compared the downing of a Malaysia Airlines plane with the 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria. Last week, Vladimir Putin pointed to Russia’s nuclear arsenal and warned the West: ‘It’s best not to mess with us”. Do you think that the current situation could possibly turn into a new world war?
A. As we have just commemorated the 100th anniversary of the First World War, parallels are quickly drawn between the events back then and those of today. But actually, I don’t see many parallels, if any at all! There are no economically powerful and heavily militarized blocs and alliances that oppose each other – but an isolated and economically weak Russia. And there is no enthusiasm among societies to step into such a military venture, as it was seen across Europe in 1914 – but instead, there is widespread fear of military confrontation in all countries.
But yes, we are currently risking the achievements of 25 years ago – the fall of the Iron Curtain and the end of the Cold War, which we are also commemorating this year. A new era of confrontation seems to be arising. Against the spirit of the Paris Charter of 1990, new dividing lines are just being drawn in Europe. State borders and national sovereignty, fundamental principles of international law, are being disregarded. And this is not the first such case, as you Georgians well know. So, I rather see the danger of a continued regional conflict, and actually another frozen conflict – as they exist here in Georgia and in other parts of the Southern Caucasus.
Q. Recently, the republican senator John McCain stated that Russia might make threats against more Eastern European states. Which country could be next?
A. Russia’s annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, and the subsequent destabilisation of the eastern part of Ukraine, has given rise to the gravest of concerns about Russian intentions across Europe. And it’s absolutely understandable that our partners in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly the Baltic States, or Poland, feel threatened by Russia. We take these concerns seriously. As members of NATO, they enjoy a full security guarantee from their partners. Already in April, NATO intensified routine measures in that region. And at the recent NATO summit in Wales, allied partners agreed to enhance joint military capabilities and security safeguards for our eastern friends.
Other countries in the region, like Ukraine, but also Moldova or Georgia, are not NATO members. Nevertheless, they enjoy our political, moral, and economic support. Thus, together we show Russia the limits and the price of her actions.
Q. The EU and USA were still trying to resolve the Russo-Ukrainian conflict with diplomatic measures right up until the Malaysia Airlines plane was shot down. Do you not think that perhaps the international community’s response was too delayed?
A. Against the background of two world wars and a cold war in the last 100 years, there is no doubt that diplomatic measures must have priority. There is, for the time being, no alternative to keeping channels of communication open and to using the instrument of political dialogue.
But you are right. It needed the tragedy of flight MH17, the deaths of 300 innocent civilians, that made it clear to us: We have to step up the pressure against Russia, mainly through economic sanctions – and the EU and the U.S. did so. But, as I said, we also have to stand ready for dialogue with Russia in order to de-escalate the conflict. Everybody needs to understand: Ukraine’s security, like that of Georgia for that matter, cannot be secured against Russia, only with Russia. We have to address the same question to Georgia as well as to the rest of Europe: do we want security with Russia or against it. And does Russia want security with us or against us?
Q. Can the EU’s sanctions stop Russia?
A. Personally, I am sceptical: their impact is rather limited. Of course, the sanctions have already had an impact, as they are worsening the economic situation in Russia, the investment climate, financial flows, technology transfers, international ratings etc. To what extent this leads to a political re-thinking in Moscow and a fundamental change in her foreign policy course – that’s a different question, and a question maybe yet too early to ask and to answer. But our experience in the past – Cuba, South Africa, Iran, Iraq, Libya – does not render me very optimistic. And I am convinced that sanctions alone do not help – as I said before, we have to talk with Russia as well, have to strike a balance between pressure and dialogue. However, given the circumstances, we didn’t have an alternative to imposing sanctions.
Q. The Ukrainian President requires more weapons. In the event of introducing more weapons to Ukraine, will it not worsen the situation?
A. Despite the recent ceasefire, we are still at a critical stage of this conflict. We should do everything to avoid any further escalation. The continuation of open military confrontation cannot be in anybody’s interests.
Q. There is big anti-American sentiment among some EU members. Don’t you think that this is hampering the solution of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict?
A. I beg to differ. There is no policy relevant to anti-American sentiment among any European Union member state. In the United States and Europe we continue to join forces and remain committed to our commonly-shared political aims and moral values. The Ukrainian crisis has been ample proof of this. It is remarkable how united, the 28 member states of the EU, whose foreign policy interests do indeed differ sometimes, and the United States have tackled the crisis. Russian policy has reinvigorated and revitalized our sense of togetherness, both in NATO and the EU. Due to the Ukrainian crisis, Europeans and Americans have rediscovered a new spirit of unity.
Q. Was it possible to avoid the Ukrainian crisis and if so, then how?
A. That’s a most difficult question! And probably impossible to answer. When we speak of the “Ukrainian crisis” – what are we talking about? The crisis as it looks today, in September 2014, is the result of many successive events in the previous weeks, months, if not years and even decades, as well as decisions and counter decisions, actions and reactions, many of them based on perceptions rather than facts.
When did the crisis start? With the conquest of the Crimean Peninsula by Russia in March? Or with the ousting of former President Yanukovich in February after weeks and months of mass demonstrations on the Maidan in Kiev? Or with his sudden and unexpected decision against the Association Agreement with the EU in November 2013 and for accepting assistance from Russia instead? Or shall we go even further back in time: to the election of Yanukovich in 2010? Or the start of the negotiations between the EU and Ukraine on an Association Agreement in 2009 without formally taking due account of Russian interests in this process? Or the Orange Revolution in 2004? All those events have had an influence on Ukraine’s route – and, eventually, its current situation and fate.
So, there have been many variables and options over the last 10 years, at least. But certainly, there has also been one element of continuity, maybe overseen and neglected from our side. And that is: Russia’s strategic and historic interest in this region; Moscow’s traditionally close political, economic and cultural ties with Kiev. And the Kremlin’s ambition not to abandon its influence over the Ukraine.
Q. Did Georgia fail to get MAP due to Russia’s influence over some powerful states?
A. Decision-making in NATO is unanimous. Out of 28 NATO-members quite a few, not just my country, were not in favour of granting MAP to Georgia at this point in time. And hence, MAP was not on the agenda of the summit. Georgia’s progress, though, was maximally reflected at the summit. The summit decided on a substantive package to help Georgia come closer to NATO as validation of this country’s achievement.
NATO leaders had to tie up a politically balanced package: the risk to challenge Russia with military measures which might have been perceived to be too bold, had to be assessed and balanced in the light of the recently-signed Association Agreement, a politico-strategic victory for Georgia, which Moscow still has to digest. Politics is the art of the possible.
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