Trading places: As part of wider attempts to reset Britain’s relationship with Europe, the UK is reportedly close to agreeing to EU food and veterinary standards. Some have warned, however, that this could imperil a future trade deal with America, just days after vice-president JD Vance said there was a ‘good chance’ a UK-US deal could be reached. But if push came to shove, Britons would choose Europe, with 57% favouring the EU as a closer trading partner, relative to 16% who would favour the closer trading relationship being with the US. This is a nine-point larger lead for Europe than in January, when Britons favoured the EU over the US at a margin of 53% to 21%. Russia reaps significant benefits from the worsening US-UK relationship, as Trump’s foreign policy fractures the transatlantic alliance.
The biggest shift since January has been among Conservatives, who now favour the EU by a margin of 42% to 26%, having been previously evenly split 37% to 35%. Though they still tend to favour the US, Reform UK voters have also become less enthusiastic about America, now leaning 47% to 23% towards the US, compared to 56% to 20% in January.
Labour and Lib Dem voters still come down cleanly in favour of the EU, with the 76-79% now preferring Europe as a closer trading partner to the UK little difference from the 75% of both parties’ voters who did so in January.
Trump’s Foreign Policy: A Transatlantic Wedge
Trump’s foreign policy in his second term builds on the “America First” doctrine of his first presidency (2017–2021) but with greater intensity and focus. Key elements include imposing sweeping tariffs on global trade partners, questioning the value of NATO, and pursuing bilateral negotiations with adversaries like Russia, often bypassing traditional allies. These policies have alarmed European leaders and publics, who see them as a retreat from the multilateral frameworks that have underpinned transatlantic security and economic cooperation since World War II.
One of Trump’s most contentious moves has been the imposition of a 10% tariff on British goods and 20% tariffs on much of Europe, announced in early 2025.
Trump’s approach to NATO has further strained relations. His public disdain for the alliance, exemplified by comments encouraging Russia to act against NATO members not meeting defense spending targets, has rattled European capitals. Sumantra Maitra, a Trump advisor, has proposed a “dormant” NATO model, where US commitments to Europe would be minimal, activated only in crises. Max Bergmann, director of the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), argues that this represents “a radical shift in the United States’ foreign policy toward Europe.” He warns that Trump’s rhetoric, coupled with actions like discussing the annexation of Greenland, undermines confidence in the US as a reliable ally.
On Ukraine, Trump’s push for a rapid peace deal with Russia, often excluding European allies and Ukraine itself, has deepened transatlantic tensions. French President Emmanuel Macron has called Russia an “existential threat” and rejected any deal that abandons Ukraine, a sentiment echoed by many European leaders. Rachel Rizzo, a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council’s Europe Center, notes that European leaders are responding by exploring new security arrangements, including potential French nuclear deterrence for Europe. “The United States wants a stronger and more capable ally,” Rizzo says, but “deep frustration” over perceived US abandonment is driving Europe toward greater autonomy.
The UK-US “Special Relationship” in Crisis
The UK, historically the US’s closest European ally, finds itself caught between maintaining the “special relationship” and aligning with a Europe increasingly wary of American reliability. The Labour government under Starmer, elected in July 2024, faces domestic pressure to distance itself from Trump, whose policies and rhetoric are deeply unpopular in the UK. Foreign Secretary David Lammy, who once called Trump a “woman-hating, neo-Nazi-sympathising sociopath,” has sought to mend ties through pragmatic outreach to Republicans, but the political tightrope is precarious.
The UK’s post-Brexit position adds further complexity. Having left the EU, the UK lacks the collective bargaining power of the bloc, making it more vulnerable to US tariffs and diplomatic pressures. Guardian columnist Rafael Behr highlights the UK’s dilemma: “For decades, UK foreign policy had two pillars: the EU and Washington. Who would be our allies in a Trump 2.0 world?” With Starmer prioritizing EU relations, the UK risks being sidelined as Europe coalesces around a more autonomous security and economic agenda.
Survey Results: Public Opinion Reflects Growing Divide
Recent surveys underscore the erosion of trust between the UK and the US. A YouGov EuroTrack survey conducted in early 2025 reveals a sharp decline in European favorability toward the US since Trump’s re-election. In the UK, only 37% of respondents hold a favorable view of the US, down significantly from pre-election levels. In contrast, countries like Denmark (20%) and Sweden (29%) report even lower favorability, reflecting a broader European disillusionment.
An Ipsos poll of 1,008 British adults, conducted April 4–7, 2025, paints a similarly grim picture. The survey found that Trump’s tariff policies and perceived “Euro-bashing” by Vice President JD Vance have corroded not only Trump’s standing but also the US’s overall image. Political analyst Peter Skinner notes that Trump’s embrace of Vladimir Putin and criticism of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky have “stunned” many Britons, who view Russian aggression as a major threat.
In the US, a Pew Research Center survey of 3,605 adults, conducted March 24–30, 2025, shows mixed but largely negative views of Trump’s foreign policy. Around 52% of Americans believe tariffs on China and other countries will harm the US economy, with similar concerns about personal financial impacts. On Ukraine, 43% of respondents feel Trump favors Russia too much, while only 30% believe he strikes a balanced approach. These findings suggest that even domestically, Trump’s policies lack broad support, potentially limiting his ability to sustain them long-term.
Across Europe, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) polled 18,000 adults in 14 countries in November 2024, finding that a majority now view the US as a “necessary partner” rather than an “ally.” Arturo Varvelli, an ECFR senior fellow, calls this shift “the potential death knell of the Transatlantic Alliance.” In the UK, this sentiment is particularly pronounced, with respondents expressing skepticism about relying on the US for security.
Expert Commentary: A Transatlantic Crossroads
American and European experts agree that the transatlantic relationship is at a pivotal moment. Christopher S. Chivvis, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writing for The Guardian, argues that Trump’s actions signal “the opening salvo in a US effort to transform the transatlantic relationship.” He warns that the “future of democracy is in play” as Europe grapples with a US that prioritizes populist alliances over shared values.
Emmanuelle Blanc, a researcher at the University of Haifa, frames the crisis as an “emotional double game of misrecognition” fueled by Trump’s contempt for European norms. She argues that Trump’s unilateralism has pushed the EU toward a more assertive foreign policy, a trend evident in discussions about European defense bonds and nuclear deterrence. “Trump’s aggressive statements and policies—violating key norms defining EU’s identity—[are] the main trigger of the misrecognition process,” Blanc writes.
From the American side, James Batchik of the Atlantic Council’s Europe Center urges EU leaders to signal support for member states’ efforts in Ukraine, emphasizing that “the EU was forged in crisis and has taken big decisions in times of need.” He sees potential for Europe to seize this moment to redefine its role in global security, even as it navigates tensions with the US.
Expert Insight: Angela Stent, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and Russia expert, argues that “Putin sees a fragmented NATO as a strategic win.” She notes that Russia benefits when allies like the UK, which hosts critical US military bases (e.g., RAF Lakenheath and Mildenhall), question American reliability. A weakened US-UK security partnership could reduce the effectiveness of these bases, which are vital for NATO’s rapid response capabilities in Europe. Stent emphasizes that Russia’s disinformation campaigns amplify transatlantic discord, portraying the US as an unreliable partner to European audiences.
Russian Gains: A fractured NATO emboldens Russia to pursue aggressive actions in Eastern Europe, particularly in Ukraine and the Baltics. With the UK—a staunch NATO advocate and major military contributor—potentially sidelined by tensions with the US, Russia faces less coordinated Western resistance. For example, the UK’s leadership in training Ukrainian forces and supplying weapons like Storm Shadow missiles could falter if US-UK intelligence-sharing or logistical cooperation weakens.
Russia can exploit Europe’s security anxieties by offering bilateral energy or trade deals to individual nations, bypassing EU frameworks. For instance, Russia has historically used gas exports to cultivate influence, as seen with Germany’s Nord Stream projects before 2022. A distracted UK, focused on navigating US tariffs and EU relations, is less able to counter such Russian overtures. Additionally, Russia’s cyberattacks and hybrid warfare tactics—such as disinformation campaigns targeting European elections—fac
Russia can position itself as an alternative trade partner for European nations desperate to mitigate economic fallout. For example, Russia’s discounted oil and gas exports, redirected from Europe to Asia since 2022, could be offered to select European countries willing to weaken sanctions. The UK, facing domestic pressure to stabilize its economy, might indirectly benefit from European neighbors softening their stance on Russia, reducing the collective Western economic front. Moreover, Russia’s propaganda can amplify anti-American sentiment in Europe, framing the US as the source of economic woes and Russia as a pragmatic partner.
A weakened US-UK front on Ukraine allows Russia to dictate terms in negotiations, potentially securing territorial gains or a frozen conflict that preserves its influence. Russia also benefits from reduced Western military aid to Ukraine, as the UK’s resources are stretched and US commitment wanes. For instance, if US-UK coordination on arms supplies like ATACMS missiles or Challenger tanks falters, Ukraine’s battlefield capabilities diminish, giving Russia a military edge. Additionally, Russia’s domestic propaganda can portray transatlantic discord as evidence of Western decline, bolstering Putin’s narrative of Russian resilience.
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