Trump’s Caucasus policy is isolationist, with little focus, potentially benefiting Russia and China

Trump’s Policy Towards the Caucasus: Isolationism and Regional Implications

• Isolationist Stance: Research from The Hague Research Institute suggests Trump’s presidency is likely to be isolationist, with little focus on the South Caucasus due to the lack of a comprehensive policy framework. This isolationism could create a power vacuum, allowing regional powers like Türkiye, Iran, China, and Russia to assert greater influence. The analysis notes, “Trump’s upcoming presidency is likely to be isolationist, with little focus on the South Caucasus due to the lack of a comprehensive policy towards the region” (The Hague Research Institute: Trump’s Upcoming Presidency and the South Caucasus).
• Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War: The war in Ukraine, ongoing as of April 2025, has shaped regional dynamics. If the conflict resolves, Russia may pivot its focus back to the Caucasus, increasing its military and diplomatic presence. Trump’s hinted scaling back or halt of Ukraine aid, as reported by Fox News in 2023, could expedite this shift, potentially destabilizing the region further. The analysis highlights, “If the war ends, Russia may pivot focus to South Caucasus, increasing military/diplomatic presence” (The Hague Research Institute: Trump’s Upcoming Presidency and the South Caucasus).
• Armenia and Azerbaijan Dynamics: The U.S. under Trump is not directly involved in the peace negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which are 90% finalized as of October 2024. The Biden administration’s efforts, such as Michael Carpenter’s letter to President Aliyev supporting the peace process, contrast with Trump’s hands-off approach. However, Trump’s potential appointment of Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, known for his pro-Armenia stance, could influence policy. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev praised Trump as a “defender of peace” (Eurasianet: Trump May Toss a Few Foreign Policy Curveballs in the Caucasus), while Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasized U.S. relations, stating, “U.S. relations are crucial for Armenia” (Armenpress: Pashinyan Emphasizes U.S. Relations).
• Georgia’s Strained U.S. Relations: Georgia’s relationship with the U.S. has been strained due to internal political issues, including the “law on foreign agents” and allegations of election fraud following the October 2024 elections. In response, the U.S. suspended its strategic partnership with Georgia after it paused EU talks, as reported by Politico (Politico: U.S. Suspends Partnership with Georgia). Despite this, bipartisan efforts in the U.S., such as the MEGOBARI Act and Black Sea Security Act, demonstrate continued support for Georgia’s Western integration (Civil.ge: Bipartisan U.S. Support via MEGOBARI Act). Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili discussed issues with Trump and Macron at a Notre Dame event, and was invited to Trump’s inauguration, indicating some engagement (The Irish Times: Zourabichvili Discusses Issues with Trump). Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze expressed optimism, stating, “We are optimistic about aligning with Trump, citing shared views” (Agenda.ge: Kobakhidze Optimistic About Trump Alignment).
• Broader Geopolitical Implications: Trump’s anti-Iran stance could challenge Armenia-Iran ties, historically close due to shared interests. China’s growing influence in Georgia, particularly through the Middle Corridor, might prompt U.S.-China competition, as noted in the analysis: “China’s growing relationship with Georgia via Middle Corridor noted, potentially prompting U.S. competition” (The Hague Research Institute: Trump’s Upcoming Presidency and the South Caucasus).

U.S. Will not prioritize pushing Georgia towards EU membership

• Current Status and EU Requirements: Georgia was granted EU candidate status on December 14, 2023, following a recommendation by the European Commission, but the accession process was “de facto halted” on June 27, 2024, due to democratic backsliding (EU for Georgia: EU Enlargement). The European Commission has stated it will not recommend opening membership talks unless Georgia changes course, emphasizing reforms in democratic institutions, freedom of the press, and judicial systems (The Guardian: Georgia Must Change Course for EU Talks). EU High Representative Josep Borrell warned in September 2023, “Candidate status needs to be earned through serious reforms and adherence to EU values. And to be frank, there is still quite a bit of work to be done” (Euronews: Borrell Warns Georgia Needs Reforms).
• Public Support vs. Government Actions: Public support for EU membership is overwhelmingly high, with surveys showing up to 90% of Georgians favoring accession (Reuters: Georgia Eyes EU Candidate Status). However, the ruling Georgian Dream party’s actions, such as introducing the “foreign agents” law echoing Russian measures, have jeopardized this path. The EU has recalled that Georgia must adopt democratic, comprehensive, and sustainable reforms, in line with European integration principles (EU for Georgia: EU Enlargement).
• Impact of Trump’s Presidency: Trump’s administration, with its focus on “America First” and reduced engagement in global affairs, is unlikely to prioritize pushing Georgia towards EU membership. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace notes, “Georgian Dream is entering a new era in which there is simply no prospect of the country joining the EU under the current government” (Carnegie Endowment: Georgia’s Ruling Party Gambled on Trump). Georgian Dream’s gamble on Trump, hoping for a transactional relationship, has not yielded results, with strained U.S.-Georgia ties further complicating Western support for EU integration.
• EU’s Role and Long-Term Prospects: Ultimately, Georgia’s EU membership depends on its ability to meet the EU’s stringent conditions, not on U.S. policy. However, Trump’s policies could indirectly affect Georgia’s strategic choices by altering the broader geopolitical landscape. For instance, if Trump’s administration cools U.S.-EU relations, as debated by the European Parliament on January 20, 2025, it might create additional hurdles for Georgia (European Parliament: Debate on Trump Presidency and EU-US Relations). Georgia’s goal to be ready for EU membership by 2030, as stated by Prime Minister Kobakhidze in February 2024, remains ambitious but uncertain given current trends (eunews.it: Georgia Aims for EU Membership by 2030).