The FINANCIAL — The 2018 recognition of Abkhazia, driven by Russian influence and diaspora ties, faces scrutiny under al-Sharaa’s government. While Georgian and Western pressure, bolstered by U.S. laws like the Consolidated Appropriations Acts, encourages revocation, ongoing Abkhaz-Syrian engagement and Syria’s domestic priorities suggest continuity for now.
In a landmark decision, U.S. President Donald Trump announced on May 13, 2025, during a speech at the Saudi-US Investment Forum in Riyadh, the lifting of U.S. sanctions on Syria. This policy shift follows the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 and the establishment of a transitional government under President Ahmed al-Sharaa. As Syria navigates its post-Assad era, attention has turned to its foreign policy, particularly its 2018 recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Russian-backed separatist regions of Georgia, as independent states. Al-Sharaa may prioritize ties with Russia-occupied Abkhazia over Western pressure, especially if reconstruction aid is secured without revocation.
We have examined the legal basis for lifting U.S. sanctions on Syria, the context of Syria’s recognition of Abkhazia, and the likelihood that the new Syrian government might revoke this recognition, considering U.S. regulations and regional dynamics.
The U.S. sanctions on Syria, were designed to address terrorism, human rights abuses, and regional destabilisation. The key frameworks include:
State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation (1979): Syria’s designation under the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) imposed restrictions on U.S. aid, defense exports, and financial transactions. Removal requires presidential certification to Congress that Syria has ceased supporting terrorism for six months, with a 45-day congressional review period (22 U.S.C. 2780).
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act (SAA) of 2003: Enacted as Public Law 108-175, the SAA bans U.S. exports (except food and medicine) and freezes Syrian assets due to terrorism support and military presence in Lebanon. The President can waive these sanctions for 180-day periods if Syria meets conditions like ending terrorism support (Section 5).
Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (2019): Part of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2020 (Public Law 116-92), it imposes secondary sanctions on entities engaging with the Syrian government. Repeal requires congressional action, a complex process given its statutory basis.
Executive Orders (EOs): Issued under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), EOs like 13338 (2004), 13572 (2011), 13573 (2011), and 13894 (2019) target Syrian officials and entities. The President can modify or revoke these unilaterally.
The lifting of sanctions, as announced by Trump, likely begins with executive actions to suspend EO-based sanctions and issue general licenses, such as Syria General License (GL) 24, which authorizes transactions with Syrian institutions until July 7, 2025, to support humanitarian aid and governance. Statutory sanctions, like those under the SAA and Caesar Act, require congressional approval for full repeal, though the SAA allows temporary waivers. The Consolidated Appropriations Acts of 2017 and 2018 (Public Laws 115-31 and 115-141), which prohibit U.S. funds from supporting Russian occupation of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Ossetia, indirectly influence this decision by signaling U.S. opposition to Russian-backed entities, including those recognized by Syria.
Syria’s Recognition of Abkhazia: Context and Motivations
Syria’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia on May 29, 2018, under Assad’s Ba’athist regime, was a rare move, making Syria the fifth UN member state to recognize these breakaway regions after Russia (2008), Nicaragua (2008), Venezuela (2009), and Nauru (2009). According to Eurasianet and Wikipedia, this decision was widely seen as a gesture of gratitude to Russia for its military support in the Syrian civil war, which helped Assad retain power. The recognition followed years of engagement, including historical ties. Abkhazia and Syria share historical connections due to the Abkhaz diaspora in Syria, descendants of 19th-century exiles from Tsarist Russia’s conquest of the Caucasus. Since 2011, Abkhazia repatriated over 500 Syrian-Abkhaz families, strengthening cultural ties, as noted by Modern Diplomacy.
Diplomatic Engagement: Delegation of occupied Abkhazia visited Damascus in 2017, meeting Syrian officials like Prime Minister Imad Khamis, and a free trade agreement was proposed. In 2018, Syria and Abkhazia established embassy-level relations, with Abkhazia opening an embassy in Damascus in 2020.
Russian Influence: While Abkhaz officials, like former foreign minister Viacheslav Chirikba, emphasized direct Abkhaz-Syrian efforts, Russia’s role was significant. Moscow encouraged its allies to recognize Abkhazia to bolster its diplomacy in the Caucasus, though other allies like Belarus and North Korea have not followed suit, according to RIAC.
Georgia condemned Syria’s recognition as a violation of international law, severing diplomatic ties, and the U.S., EU, and others criticized it as undermining Georgia’s territorial integrity, per the U.S. Mission to the OSCE. The Consolidated Appropriations Acts reinforce this stance by prohibiting U.S. aid to countries recognizing Abkhazia, complicating Syria’s international relations under Assad.
The fall of Assad’s regime and the rise of Ahmed al-Sharaa’s transitional government, formed on March 29, 2025, shift Syria’s foreign policy landscape. Several factors influence the likelihood of Syria revoking its recognition of Abkhazia:
Factors Supporting Revocation
Pressure from Georgia and Western Allies: On January 31, 2025, four Georgian opposition parties—described as pro-Western by Interpressnews—urged al-Sharaa to withdraw recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, citing the fall of Assad’s “genocidal regime.” Georgia’s severed ties with Syria since 2018 could be restored if recognition is revoked, fostering diplomatic and economic benefits. The U.S., EU, and UK, which condemned Syria’s 2018 recognition, may tie sanctions relief and reconstruction aid to reversing this policy, aligning with the Consolidated Appropriations Acts’ stance against recognizing Russian-backed regions.
The new Syrian government’s need for reconstruction aid and diplomatic legitimacy may eventually tip the scales toward revocation, but only if Western partners prioritize this issue in negotiations.
Assad’s regime relied heavily on Russian military support, a key driver of the 2018 recognition. Al-Sharaa’s government, backed by Turkey and engaging with the U.S. and Arab states, is less beholden to Moscow. Russia’s diminished role in Syria post-Assad reduces the incentive to maintain recognition of Abkhazia, especially as Syria seeks Western support for reconstruction.
Al-Sharaa’s government aims to stabilize Syria and attract investment, based on statements of the transitional government. Revoking recognition could improve relations with the EU, U.S., and Arab League, which suspended Syria during the civil war but is now considering reintegration.
Factors Against Revocation
Despite the regime change, engagement with Russia-occupied Abkhazia persists. On May 13, 2025, Syria’s new education minister met with Abkhazia’s ambassador, suggesting continuity in relations, according to a post on X by @raphaelbossniak
The Abkhaz embassy in Damascus and historical diaspora ties, as highlighted by Modern Diplomacy, create a foundation for maintaining recognition.
Abkhazia’s recognition offers Syria a foothold in the Caucasus, potentially valuable for future trade or geopolitical leverage. The 2017 free trade agreement and cultural exchanges, like the 2016 wrestling match in Sokhumi, underscore mutual interests. Al-Sharaa may prioritize these ties over Western pressure, especially if reconstruction aid is secured without revocation.
Domestic Priorities: The transitional government’s focus on internal stability, minority rights, and economic recovery, as reported by CNN and CBS, may delay foreign policy shifts. Revoking recognition could be seen as a low priority compared to rebuilding infrastructure or countering terrorism, per al-Sharaa’s statements.
The U.S. imposed sanctions on Georgian officials, visa restrictions, and suspended $95 million in aid, while the EU froze €30 million in military aid and paused Georgia’s EU accession process, according to the Financial Times and Eurasianet. These measures reflect Western frustration with Georgian Dream’s policies, including its refusal to align fully with sanctions on Russia over Ukraine.
The potential revocation by Syria’s new transitional government, led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, of its 2018 recognition of Abkhazia as an independent state could represent a significant diplomatic victory for Georgia’s current government, particularly in the context of its worsening relations with the West.
Georgian Dream could use this as a tangible achievement to rally nationalist support, countering opposition narratives of government failure, as suggested by Modern Diplomacy’s analysis of Georgia’s polarized politics.
The likelihood of revocation is moderate but leans toward maintaining recognition in the short term. Legally, revoking recognition is straightforward, as it involves a unilateral diplomatic act by Syria’s president or foreign ministry, not bound by international treaties. However, the Consolidated Appropriations Acts limit U.S. aid to Syria unless it reverses policies supporting Russian-backed entities like Abkhazia. This creates pressure, especially as the U.S. lifts sanctions, with GL 24 signaling temporary relief to test the new government’s direction.
Georgia’s domestic challenges, including worsening relation with the West may limit its ability to push Syria for revocation. Without clear Western contribution al-Sharaa may avoid antagonizing Russia backed Abkhaz allies.
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