NATO Should Just Shoot Down Russia’s Missiles

The Western alliance has done nothing to push back against Russian aggression and subterfuge. It can act decisively, and fast.

Photo: Exercise Artemis Strike is a German-led tactical live fire exercise with live Patriot and Stinger missiles at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Chania, Greece from Oct. 31-Nov. 09. Over 200 US soldiers and approximately 650 German airmen will be participating in the realistic training within a combined construct, exercise the rigors associated with force projection and educate operators on their air missile defense systems. The 10th Army Air Missile Defense Command will deploy, operate and fire live missiles within a tactical scenario, under Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe operational readiness evaluation criteria. Credit: Anthony Sweeney / US Army Europe and Africa.
Since 2008, Russia has occupied Georgia and poisoned Tbilisi’s politics, its hybrid warfare has threatened to erode European borders, and refugee crises have moved through Southeastern and Central Europe to the Nordics and Baltics.

The West’s response has been pusillanimous and ineffective. After the full-scale invasion of 2022, a US-led coalition’s vacillation has protected Russian territory from Ukrainian attack almost as much as it has protected Ukraine.

Moscow’s war machine is set to level Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second city, and push forward on several axes. In the midst of the never-ending European debate, Moscow has simply moved the borders, claiming vast tracts of land as its own.

It’s never a good idea to let an enemy have the initiative and to make that a central principle of your strategy. Only by wrongfooting the Kremlin by making it as unsure of the West’s next move can we restore some semblance of balance.

It’s time for European countries to fight back, using their capacity to escalate and consider their capacity to deny.

European air defenses should begin operations from NATO countries to shoot down Russian missiles and drones over Western Ukraine. Guarded by NATO’s borders, a new air defense network would not qualify as meaningful escalation — much like the Western decision to defend Israel from an Iranian attack in April — despite the inevitable Russian threats.

Russian missiles and drones aimed at Ukraine have repeatedly entered NATO airspace and, so far, the response has been tepid. These weapons have crossed NATO borders and have still been allowed to deliver death to Ukraine, much to Kyiv’s understandable frustration.

Such repeated violations are finally sparking anger in Warsaw and other capitals, and Poland is considering extending its air defenses over Western Ukraine.

This is an obvious and overdue response to Russia’s behavior, and it must be encouraged and expanded. The technical arguments are self-evident: the air defense systems of NATO members, such as Patriot batteries, have the range (about 100 miles) to protect a massive area of Ukrainian territory.

Air defense systems in Poland and Romania would not cover all of Ukraine but could protect the major population and industrial centers in the west of the country. The immediate benefit to the war effort would be allowing Ukraine to move its surviving S-300 and ally-provided Patriot and Franco-German SAMP/T batteries closer to the heaviest fighting.

This would cut into Russian airpower along the front, helping prevent Kharkiv’s destruction and clearing the airspace for the arrival of the first squadrons of F-16s, which is thought imminent.

The rejuvenation of Ukrainian airpower will be vital to the next part of the war. Ukraine has successfully targeted Russian air defenses and weakened Moscow’s virtually irreplaceable fleet of A-50 airborne and early warning aircraft. The battlefield is being prepared for Ukrainian fighter jets, which will now be supported by Swedish airborne early warning aircraft, and freeing up advanced air defense systems will make their job easier.

Longer-term, Ukraine would make significant population centers safer for civilians as well as shield the country’s battered energy network from further attack, and so allow its rebuilding. This issue is now extremely urgent — the damage done is enormous and the country simply cannot fight a major war in winter with a badly degraded power system.

In addition, Ukraine is desperate to raise domestic defense production, with Western investment a key element. Foreign firms will be much likelier to do this if they know their facilities are safe.

There are other direct benefits for the West. Defense experts, such as Jan Kallberg, have detailed the unrivaled tactical and algorithmic benefit of battlefield use of Patriot systems. That has been underlined elsewhere.

Counterarguments will come from policymakers who fear Russian “escalation,” echoing a failed strategy of crisis management that has hamstrung Ukrainian defenses despite no evidence to date of Russia acting on its previous “red lines.”

NATO forces in Poland and Romania, limiting their interventions to shooting down Russian missiles and drones, could not provide Russia with any justification to escalate. These are actions to assist a country suffering unprovoked aggression in exercising its right to self-defense under the United Nations Charter. Ukraine’s allies have every right to assist its struggle.

By destroying only unmanned systems, no Russian pilots would be at risk, unless they encroached on NATO airspace. The Kremlin is unlikely to risk a war with NATO by bombing Polish territory.

Of course, this would represent an escalation, as NATO members would be directly firing on Russian military equipment. And Putin’s acolytes would no doubt respond with a tirade of threats and might increase efforts to subvert European politics or sabotage European defense industries.

But Russia is already running a sabotage campaign against European infrastructure, both at sea and on land. It is not only reasonable to respond, it is absolutely necessary for the sake of continental security.

NATO has the opportunity to curb Russian airpower and disrupt a vicious bombing campaign that has been largely aimed at Ukrainian civilians.

There are risks. Critically, Ukrainians will be asked to accept that debris may harm people and buildings. Direct intervention, even against unmanned systems, would be a new step by NATO, but it would be calibrated to a low level of involvement that would encourage the Kremlin to bluster and rant without taking meaningful action.

The US and its European allies should argue that an expanded air defense operation is de-escalating, as preemptively shooting down Russian missiles that might hit NATO territory reduces rather than increases the risk of war.

Kyiv cannot afford its current vulnerability. Russian strategic momentum on the front is applying terrific pressure, and safe skies can help Ukraine’s economy and national morale.

NATO members could shift the balance of air power overnight through actions with a risk threshold much lower than even previous military assistance, finally answering Russia’s so-far unchecked violations of international law.

Michael C. DiCianna is a research assistant with the Yorktown Institute. He has worked as a consultant in the US intelligence community for several years, focusing on military affairs in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.