By global standards, the U.S. has a relatively low level of religious nationalism

In many countries, religion and politics are deeply intertwined. The belief that a country’s historically predominant religion should be a central part of its national identity and drive policymaking is sometimes described as “religious nationalism.”

A wide range of movements have been described as religious nationalism, including in India, where Prime Minister Narendra Modi has campaigned and governed on the idea that Hindu faith and culture should shape government policies; and in Israel, where Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is backed by a coalition that includes ultra-Orthodox and national religious parties.

But there is no universally accepted definition of religious nationalism, leaving lots of room for debate over who is, say, a Christian nationalist or a Hindu nationalist. This has made it difficult to assess how common such views are around the world.

To help fill this gap, Pew Research Center set out to measure – in an impartial, consistent way – what share of people in different countries view the dominant religious tradition as central to their national identity, want their leaders to share their religious beliefs, and want religious teachings to guide their laws.

We asked four key questions in nationally representative surveys of nearly 55,000 people, conducted from January to May 2024 in three dozen countries¹:

• How important is belonging to the historically predominant religion to being truly part of your national identity? (For example, how important is being a Muslim to being truly Indonesian, or being a Christian to being truly American?)
• How important is it to you for your national leader to share your religious beliefs?
• How much influence do you think the historically predominant religion’s sacred text should have on the laws of your country? (For example, how much influence should the Quran have on the laws of Turkey, or should the Bible have on the laws of Italy?)
• When the sacred text conflicts with the will of the people, which should have more influence on the laws of your country? (This follow-up question was asked only of respondents who answered the previous question by saying that the sacred text should have a “fair amount” or “great deal” of influence on their country’s laws.)

For this report, we define “religious nationalists” as people who identify with the historically predominant religion (also often the majority religion) and take a strongly religious position on all four of these questions.

In Turkey, for example, a religious nationalist would be a Muslim who says …

• Being a Muslim is very important to being truly Turkish;
• And it is very important that Turkey’s president shares their religious beliefs;
• And the Quran should have at least a fair amount of influence over Turkey’s laws;
• And when the Quran conflicts with the will of the people, the Quran should have more influence.

In Israel, a religious nationalist would be a Jew who says …

• Being a Jew is very important to being truly Israeli;
• And it is very important that Israel’s prime minister shares their religious beliefs;
• And Jewish scripture should have at least a fair amount of influence over Israel’s laws;
• And when Jewish scripture conflicts with the will of the people, Jewish scripture should have more influence.

In the United States, a religious nationalist would be a Christian who says …

• Being a Christian is very important to being truly American;
• And it is very important that the U.S. president shares their religious beliefs;
• And the Bible should have at least some influence over U.S. laws;
• And when the Bible conflicts with the will of the people, the Bible should have more influence.

Using this definition, the prevalence of religious nationalism varies widely across the 35 countries where we asked all four of these questions. Fewer than 1% of adults surveyed meet the criteria in Germany and Sweden, compared with more than four-in-ten in Indonesia (46%) and Bangladesh (45%).

In this global perspective, the U.S. does not stand out for especially high levels of religious nationalism.

Just 6% of U.S. adults are religious nationalists by the combination of these four measures, about the same level as several other countries surveyed in the Americas, such as Chile (6%), Mexico (8%) and Argentina (8%).Canada has a relatively low share of religious nationalists (3%), while Colombia (12%), Brazil (13%) and Peru (17%) have somewhat higher shares.

However, the U.S. does stand out when compared with other high-income countries, particularly on questions about religious texts. U.S. adults are more likely than people in any other high-income country surveyed to say the Bible currently has either a great deal or some influence over the laws of their country (in other countries, people were asked about other texts).

And the U.S. public is also more inclined than people in other high-income countries to say that the Bible should have that kind of influence (again, relative to the sacred texts asked about in other places).

Americans are also among the most likely of any high-income public to:

• Describe a religious identity (in this case, being a Christian) as veryimportant to truly sharing in the national identity (being American)
• Say it’s very important for their country’s political leader to have strong religious beliefs

Differences between wealthy and less wealthy countries

The survey shows that, in general, high-income countries differ sharply from middle-income countries (as defined by the World Bank) when it comes to public attitudes about religion.

People in middle-income countries are more likely than people in richer countries to say:

• Religion does more good than harm for society
• Religion encourages tolerance rather than intolerance
• Religion does not encourage superstitious thinking

These differences are related to levels of religiousness. People who live in middle-income countries are more likely than people in high-income countries to have a religious affiliation, to pray regularly and to say religion is important in their lives.

Religious people tend to favor a role for religion in public life. So it stands to reason that in countries where more people follow a religion, religion is more likely to be seen as a positive influence in society.

For example, in Bangladesh – where about nine-in-ten adults are Muslim – 94% say religion mostly helps society. But in Sweden – where fewer than half of adults surveyed (47%) have a religious affiliation – 42% say religion is helpful.

People in middle- and high-income countries also differ over the role they think religion should play in public life.

For example, in many middle-income countries, majorities want religious texts like the Bible or the Quran to have either a great deal or a fair amount of influence on their country’s laws. By contrast, in most high-income countries surveyed, only a minority of adults want religious texts to play this role.

In some wealthier countries, people also tend to prioritize the will of the people over religious texts when the two conflict. In middle-income countries, the opposite is true.

People in middle-income countries are also more likely than those in high-income countries to say it’s very important for the leader of their country to have religious beliefs that are the same as their own (and to have strong religious beliefs, period).

Religion plays more of a role in national identity in the middle-income countries than the high-income countries surveyed. While comparatively few people in most high-income countries say that sharing the country’s historically predominant religion is very important for being “truly” part of that nation, half or more in most middle-income countries see religion as a key part of national belonging.

People in middle-income countries are also more likely to be religious nationalists. Religious nationalists do not make up a majority of the population in any country surveyed. But in 13 of the 17 middle-income countries surveyed (since Tunisia is not included in our analysis of religious nationalism), there are double-digit shares of religious nationalists. These shares reach around a third or more in Kenya (32%), Malaysia (38%), Bangladesh (45%) and Indonesia (46%).

In most high-income countries, there are fewer religious nationalists. Indeed, in nine of the 18 high-income countries surveyed, 1% or less of the public meets the criteria. While the shares are somewhat higher in a few countries – 9% in Greece and Israel, for example – in no high-income country do religious nationalists make up a double-digit percentage of the overall public.

Demographics of religious nationalism

In many countries, people who pray daily are more likely than those who pray less frequently to be religious nationalists (under the definition used for this report). For example, in India, 27% of people who say they pray at least once a day are religious nationalists, compared with 17% of those who pray less frequently.

Older people in some countries are somewhat more likely than younger people to be religious nationalists. In Greece, 13% of people ages 50 and older are religious nationalists, compared with 8% of those ages 35 to 49 and only 1% of adults under 35.

In many countries, people with lower levels of education are also somewhat more likely to be religious nationalists than those with higher levels of education. In Kenya, 38% of people with less than a secondary degree are religious nationalists, compared with 22% of those with a secondary degree or more education.

In a few countries, people with lower incomes are more likely than those with higher incomes to be religious nationalists. This is the case in Brazil, where 17% of respondents with incomes at or below the median are religious nationalists, compared with 9% of those with higher incomes.

In addition, people who place themselves on the ideological right are more likely to be religious nationalists than those in the center or on the left in many countries where the survey asked about political ideology. In Poland, for example, 8% of people on the right are religious nationalists, compared with 1% or fewer in the center and on the left.

In Europe, people with favorable views of several right-wing populist partiesare also somewhat more likely than people with unfavorable views of those parties to be religious nationalists. (For more on how these parties were defined, refer to the Appendix.) Returning to the example of Poland, 10% of adults who hold a favorable view of the Law and Justice party (PiS) are religious nationalists, compared with 1% of those who see PiS unfavorably.

(Of course, in the case of ideology and party favorability, the relationship could also be reversed. That is, people who hold certain beliefs about religious nationalism may be more likely to have favorable views of specific right-wing populist parties or to place themselves on the right of the ideological spectrum than those who do not hold those beliefs.)

In Israel, Haredi and Dati Jews (33%) are much more likely than Masorti Jews (5%) and Hiloni Jews (1%) to be religious nationalists. (Because of sample size considerations, we combine Haredim and Datiim for analysis in this report.)

Can states have a religious character and be democratic?

In a number of countries with sizable Muslim and Jewish populations, we also asked whether their country can be both democratic and a Muslim or Jewish country.

In countries with Muslim majorities, most do think the state can be both democratic and Muslim. The shares who believe this are particularly high in Bangladesh (86%), Tunisia (82%) and Malaysia (80%). (Islam is the official state religion in Bangladesh and Malaysia, and it was the official religion in Tunisia until 2022).

Slightly smaller majorities in Indonesia (70%) and Turkey (67%) agree that their country can be both Muslim and democratic at the same time. But in Nigeria – where Muslims are not the overwhelming majority of the population – only 40% think Nigeria can be both a Muslim state and a democratic state.

Israel defines itself as “Jewish and democratic,” and indeed, 73% of adults surveyed in Israel agree their country can be both. Only about a quarter say the country cannot be a Jewish state and a democratic state at the same time. Still, there are major differences by religion, as well as among Jewish religious groups.

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